then the resulting search was likewise illegal. To avoid this conclusion the Court relies at least partially on the fact that the search uncovered the jewels. The validity of this reasoning is highly doubtful. Failure to comply with statutory requirements for arrest has rendered arrests illegal and unlawful. 33 The two requirements then for a legal arrest in this case were probable cause and compliance with the statutory provision of notice of authority and cause. All authorities agree that the fruits of the search could not be used to supply probable cause for the underlying arrest. 34 If the fruits cannot be used to fulfill one predicate of a legal arrest, i.e., probable cause, they should not be used to justify the presumption that the defendant knew his cause of arrest. A search and arrest should not be permitted to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps in any manner. 5 George P. Doyle
WAIVER oF TRIAL BY JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Defendant was indicted for rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree, carnal abuse of a child, and endangering the life, health and morals of a child. The case had given rise to some emotional newspaper commentary in which the defendant was described as a "sex monster," and a "molester of dozens of children." The defendant believed that because of this notoriety he could not obtain a fair jury trial,' and thus he moved, on the authority of a 1938 amendment to Article I, section 2 of the New York Constitution, to waive trial by jury. 2 The motion was denied, and the defendant subsequently was convicted on all counts. He appealed, assigning as error the denial of this motion. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, granting the People permission to appeal. Held, in a four-three decision, that where a waiver of trial by jury is requested in good faith, the court, if confident that the defendant fully understands the consequences of his act, must then grant the waiver as a matter of right. guished between waiver of a part of the full jury of twelve and waiver of the entire jury in advance of trial, 4 there had been at least one New York case prior to the 1938 amendment permitting the replacement of one juror where the defendant had consented to the change. 5 However, a general prohibition against either form of waiver persisted. 6 This rule had devolved by implication from the language of various constitutional provisions providing for jury trials. Differing jurisdictions appear thus to have ruled according to the restrictive or permissive tone of the constitutional provisions with which they were concerned. The federal courts, without explicit constitutional authority, have since 1930 permitted the waiver of trial by jury in criminal cases, though not without the consent of both prosecution and court. 8 Since the rule in New York owed its existence largely to the strength of constitutional language, 9 it was not until a constitutional amendment explicitly provided for the waiver that it was allowed.' 0 A waiver provision was first adopted in 1937 without limitations or qualifications other than for capital offenses, as to which trial by jury remained compulsory."' The Constitutional Convention of the following year, however, amended the provision, adding that the waiver must be by written instrument, executed before and with approval of a court of proper jurisdiction. 12 This qualification was then adopted as part of the 1938 constitution. The proposer of the amendment had sought in this way to insure against ill-considered waivers and to provide for evidence of the transactions.' Caffrey. 15 The court there held, according to the intentions of the constitutional convention, that the trial judge is obliged only to insure against an ill-considered waiver, and that beyond this, the waiver may be had as of right. 16 The court further held that, although the defendant's purpose in seeking the waiver was merely to sever his action from that of his co-defendants, the waiver could nevertheless be granted, and, if necessary, the guilt or innocence of the person waiving could be excluded from the jury's consideration. Shortly after this case, however, in People v. Masurci, 17 the court specifically refused the conclusions of
Matter of Scott, holding that the 1938 amendment gives the court full discretion in ruling on a motion for waiver. The Court of Appeals subsequently overruled Matter of Scott in part, holding that in co-defendant situations, a waiver of jury by one party necessarily requires a severance, and that a defendant should not be permitted to obtain by indirection the severance which had been directly refused him.' 8 The Court of Appeals thus left until the instant case the interpretation of the 1938 amendment which, as is suggested by a comparison of Matter of Scott and Masucci, was open to differing views.
As noted above, the decision of the instant case was rendered by a bare majority. Judge Van Voorhis concurred, however, on the ground that there had been ". . . an abuse of discretion . . . in this case," and since this position rests at some indeterminate point between the majority and minority, the present holding offers no predictive value on this issue as to cases not precisely on all fours with the instant case. The point of dissension centered upon the latitude of judicial discretion attaching to the phrase, ". . . with the approval of a judge . . . ," as it appears in the relevant constitutional provision. 19 The majority interpreted the amendment as having been created primarily for the defendant, holding that according to legislative intentions, 20 the judicial function extends only to a finding that the defendant has been fully informed of the importance of the right being waived. Additionally, as had been earlier decided, 2 ' it must further be shown that the waiver is tendered in good faith rather than in pursuit of some procedural advantage. Judge Desmond, writing the dissenting opinion, reasoned that the authority of legislative intent is superceded where, as in the case of constitutional amendment, the provision is adopted by referendum. In such circumstances the language must be accepted at face value, according to its intent as the voters must necessarily have understood it to be. The effect of removing this legislative definition then gives the trial judge full discretion, for the disputed word, "approval," denotes ". . . a final expression of favorable view .. .subject to no-limitation .... ',22 The dissenting judges clearly do not interpret the amendment as having conferred new powers upon the defendant.
The rule that a constitutional provision should not be construed so as to defeat either its purpose or the intent of the people in adopting it 2 " would appear ambiguous in view of the instant case. There can be no doubt that the proposers of this amendment intended the effect which was given here. 24 And though it has been contended that those intentiops could easily have been more explicit, 25 the framers of the provision nevertheless thought their language to be sufficiently clear. 26 The dissenting opinion, however, points to the entirely valid proposition that an intervening referendum may vitiate this legislative intent. 27 The people have a substantial interest in criminal proceedings, not only where a controlling statute has been adopted by referendum, but inasmuch as the people, theoretically at least, are an interested party, perhaps they, standing as a jury, should be permitted to try the offender. 28 It should also be observed that, where the jury is waived, a burden which formerly was shared by the conscience of twelve now devolves upon one. Opposed to these considerations is the traditional view that the jury trial is essentially a privilege of the accused, 29 and that in waiving the right, not only is the defendant benefited, but the state also benefits in savings of time and expense. 80 The commentators have generally endorsed the waiver, reasoning that a jury may be of definite disadvantage to the defendant, 3 ' and that to impose the process upon him abrogates the tradition of according the defendant all possible safeguards. There is, in addition, evidence that the common law rule may be leaned upon too heavily, for it cannot be shown that the framers of the United States Constitution had the intention of creating such a prohibition. 3 2 Though the federal courts continue to condition the waiver upon consent of the prosecutor and the In this criminal proceeding the prosecution introduced as evidence incriminating portions of a record of a pre-arraignment interrogation of defendant. Counsel for defendant requested that exculpatory portions of the same record be read into evidence. This request was denied by the trial judge on the ground that the statements were not being offered as a confession. On appeal from an order of the Appellate Division' affirming a judgment of the Kings County Court convicting defendant, held, reversed unanimously and new trial granted. It was error to deny defendant's request that exculpatory portions of the record be admitted into evidence after allowing incriminating portions of the same record to be introduced by the prosecution, even though defendant, as a witness, denied making some of the statements contained therein. The principle of evidence that a verbal utterance must be taken as a whole is deeply rooted in the common law and may be traced back to the seventeenth century.
2 There is no question that where one party offers into evidence only a part of a statement the other party may use any remaining parts of the same statement as he desires insofar as they are relevant.
3 Both the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 4 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5 explicitly state the rule. The only limitation is that the parts of the statement which the parties wish to offer into evidence must be relevant and explanatory of those parts already given into evidence.
6
The state of the law in New York can best be summed up as follows:
It is well settled that where use is made in a judicial proceeding of a prior declaration the entire declaration at the time made so far as 
